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Abstract:
John Milbank’s and Phillip Blond’s narratives of modernity’s descent to
nihilism identify the “metaphysics of the sublime” as a feature of modernity,
assimilated from Kant’s critical project, that is particularly problematic for the
robust post-modern Christian theology proposed in Radical Orthodoxy. This
essay argues that the sublime is not the concept most fundamental to their
account of Kant’s role in modernity. Far more important is the
“phenomenon/noumenon” distinction, which Milbank and Blond read as a
“two-world” distinction—an understanding that, despite a long history in Kant
interpretation, is not Kant’s. It is less important, however, that constructive
dialogue between Radical Orthodoxy and Catholic theology correct this
misreading of Kant. More important will be efforts to understand the
metaphor of the “immense depth of things,” which Radical Orthodox offers in
contrast to the “metaphysics of the sublime,” particularly in relation to the
concepts of participation and the analogy of attribution that emerge from
Radical Orthodoxy’s reading of Aquinas.

Students and teachers alike will readily confirm that Kant is not
an “easy read.” Even the eminent American Kant scholar, Lewis White
Beck, memorably remarked, “It is regrettable that Kant was not more
careful; though had he been so, the race of Kant commentators would
be unemployed” (Beck 1960, 221). Yet treatments of Kant by
proponents of Radical Orthodoxy, such as John Milbank and Phillip
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Blond, prove often enough to be an even harder “read” than Kant’s
own texts. In my own case, this difficultly may arise from the fact that
years of wrestling with Kant’s texts from a philosophical stance has
made it difficult for me to stretch my interpretive muscles into this
newly articulated theological grip for gaining purchase on the
significance of his work for these “post-modern” times. Yet the
difficulty in reading Milbank et al. on Kant may also stem from a
hazard endemic to any effort to show the bearing that the work of a
thinker from a previous generation has upon the thought and practice
of our own. Conceptual vertigo is one likely outcome from trying to
read Kant, as Radical Orthodoxy seeks to do, from a multiple “optic”:
as a sign of (and to) both his time and ours—let alone as also a sign to
and for times between his and ours. Finally, another part of the
difficulty may stem from the fact that Milbank and Blond both attend
to Kantian texts—most notably the Critique of the Power of
Judgment—that are unfamiliar inasmuch as they have, for far too long
a time, undeservedly held little interest as a field of gainful
employment among the race of Kant scholars.
This essay does not propose to address all of the difficulties
involved in reading “Radical Orthodoxy on Kant”; neither does it plan
to provide an extended gloss on some of the unjustly neglected
Kantian texts that are central to such a reading of Kant. Its main task
to is to begin to decipher the role that Milbank and Blond ascribe to
Kant in the “alternative story” they tell about the intellectual trajectory
of modernity. In their telling, Kant is “the fulfillment, not the
overcoming, of late scholasticism” (Milbank 2000, 38). Being such
fulfillment, however, garners little praise. Milbank remarks that “Kant
perfects metaphysical dogmatism because his limiting of the import of
the phenomenal is attained only by a safeguarding of the noumenal
against the phenomenal, which after all is the real pietistic, antiCatholic and anti ‘mystical’ aim of the critical philosophy” (Milbank
2000, 39).
Placing Kant among the adversarii of Christian orthodoxy is
hardly new. He usually gets placed there in virtue of his
dismantlement of the putatively “traditional” arguments for the
existence of God and for the immortality of the soul, or for his seeming
reduction of religion to following the moral dictates of conscience,
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and/or for an allegedly Pelagian account of moral conversion which is
coupled to a theory of atonement that, at best, assigns only a
symbolically representative function to the death and resurrection of
Jesus.1 As the story of modernity unfolds in the hands of Milbank and
Blond, however, the feature they intriguingly highlight for Kant’s role
in its denouement is none of the above; it is, instead, his articulation
of the notion of the sublime.2 As described by Milbank, the sublime
constitutes “a realm of ineffable majesty beyond the bounds of the
possibility of theoretical knowledge, a domain which cannot be
imaginatively represented, and yet whose overwhelming presence can
be acknowledged by our frustrated imaginative powers” (Milbank
1990, 204).
The sublime carries a great deal of weight in this telling of the
story of modernity. When Milbank looks back to locate Kant in relation
to his predecessors, he sees the sublime functioning to mark the
(vast) distance that separates Kant’s treatment of transcendence from
those accounts that can be considered characteristic of Patristic and
“early to high” Scholastic thought about “consummate transcendence”
(Milbank 2000, 38):
If one fails to realize this [i.e., the Kantian denial of any real kinship between
the visible and the invisible worlds], then the danger is that one will confuse
the Kantian sublimity of pure infinite possibility with the traditional theological
notion of a divine darkness that is not the abyss of contentless will, but rather
the darkness to us of an utterly dazzling light suffusing its manifold infinite of
formed content with the full intensity of a single illumination. (Milbank 2000,
40)

In looking forward to the full articulation of the modern that succeeds
upon Kant, the sublime then becomes the token of a world and culture
from which God is, in principle, absent:
And it is in this form [as immanent to rationality(?)] that one could suggest
that the Kantian theory of the sublime completes the secular dismissal of God
from the realm of experience. Conceived in this way, the sublime then
provides a uniquely successful synthesis of both the nominalist fear of God and
the Scotist emphasis on a prior and determinate sphere of knowledge (an
emphasis that actually ends with the dismissal of God from cognition). The
peculiar though understandable result of this is that God becomes both
unknowable and yet deeply feared. (Blond 1998, 15)
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In accord with the story’s close interweaving of the theological with the
theoretical underpinnings of cultural and political practice, the sublime,
as token of the a-theistic and the nihilistic, has an important function
in the area of public discourse. It serves as the fundamental
conceptual legitimation for the marginalization of theology and religion
in modernity—in Milbank’s terms, for “the policing of the sublime”—by
social science and the secular polity:
Sociology’s “policing of the sublime” exactly coincides with the actual
operations of secular society which excludes religion from its modes of
“discipline and control,” while protecting it as a ‘private’ value, and sometimes
invoking it at the public level to overcome the antinomy of a purely
instrumental and goalless rationality, which is yet made to bear the burden of
ultimate political purpose. (Milbank 1990, 106)

Finally, the sublime has a role to play not only in fencing the
theological off from public practice but also in shaping the practices of
the liberal polity that is arguably the paradigmatic public form of
modernity:
In the metaphysics of the sublime the absolutely equal and formally fixed
relationship in which we, as liberal subjects, stand to the unknown absolute,
serves to confirm the world (the enlightened bourgeois world) as it is. (Milbank
1997, 12)

Milbank and Blond are not the first to hear in The Critique of the
Power of Judgment resonances with profound power to affect the
tonality of the whole of Kant’s critical theory; nor are they even the
first to identify the theological, social, and political chords that he
sounds within the complexity of this text.3 As I noted earlier, what
initially strikes one as new in their account is the selection of the
Kantian sublime as the concept that most fully presents the central
features of Kant’s critical project that are most problematic with
respect to the kind of robust Christian theology for a post-modern era
that Radical Orthodoxy seeks to articulate. Yet, as I have tried to
puzzle out the particulars of their reading of the Kantian sublime I
have found myself wondering whether there is anything remarkably
new here, be it with respect to their analysis of the notion of the
sublime or in the lineaments of the story/argument that makes Kant
“the fulfillment, not the overcoming, of late scholasticism.”
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In order to bring into better focus the question of whether this is
a new criticism of Kant, let me return to a claim of Milbank’s that I
cited earlier: “Kant perfects metaphysical dogmatism because his
limiting of the import of the phenomenal is attained only by a
safeguarding of the noumenal against the phenomenal, which after all
is the real pietistic, anti-Catholic and anti ‘mystical’ aim of the critical
philosophy” (added emphasis mine). I will have to leave to another
time the exploration of what Milbank may have in mind by his threefold characterization of the “real” aim of the critical philosophy as
“pietistic, anti-Catholic, and anti ‘mystical.’” I consider the key point to
examine, instead, to lie in the expression “a safeguarding of the
noumenal against the phenomenal”—a phrase which itself resonates
with other “dualizing,” if not dualistic, characterizations Milbank and
Blond each make of Kant’s critical philosophy. Continuing in the same
vein, Milbank notes “What is refused here is not the groundless
extrapolation from the phenomenal, but rather (without grounds) any
notion of attributive analogy or participation, that is to say any real
kinship between the visible and invisible worlds (as has been well
argued by Phillip Blond)” (Milbank 2000, 39).4 In another context, he
writes:
What the radical pietists realised was that to be human means, primarily, that
we must reckon with the immense depth behind things. There are only two
possible attitudes towards this depth: for the first, like Kant, we distinguish
what is clear from what is hidden; but then the depth is an abyss, and what
appears, as only apparent, will equally induce vertigo. This is why criticism,
the attitude of pure reason itself, is also the stance of nihilism. . . . The second
possibility is that we trust the depth, and appearance as the gift of depth, and
history as the restoration of the loss of this depth in Christ. (Milbank 1999, 32,
emphasis mine)

Remarks such as these, especially when read in coordination
with Blond’s charges against Kant’s “cognitively self-sufficient finitude”
(Blond 1998, 15), his observations about “Kant’s sundering of thought
from reality” (Blond 1998, 16) and the “Kantian opposition between
the conceptual and empirical” (Blond 1998, 38)5 indicate to me that
the sublime may not be the concept most fundamental to the tale they
have told and to Kant’s role in that tale. What seems to bear far more
weight is the construal given to Kant’s much vexed distinction between
the “phenomenal” and the “noumenal.” It should hardly be surprising
that the distinction that Kant himself considered to be fundamental to
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his whole critical enterprise and that proved to be a point of fierce
contention in the reception of the critical philosophy should again be
contested in Milbank’s and Blond’s effort to read Kant as a (cautionary)
sign for our times. Nor should it be surprising that their construal
takes this distinction to mark a divide between two “worlds”—a divide
for which the critical project is then taken to provide a bridge—for this
is a construal that has a venerable history in Kant interpretation. It is,
moreover, a construal that has had a significant impact on subsequent
Western thought and culture—including many of the deleterious ones
that Milbank and Blond justifiably bemoan.
There is a fundamental problem with such a “two-worlds”
construal of this distinction, however: There are good reasons to think
that it is not Kant’s own construal. However else Kant understood the
phenomenon-noumenon distinction—and, considering the amount of
conceptual work he asks it to do in his critical philosophy, he
understood it in many ways, not all of them fully coherent with one
another—he did not understand it as fundamentally marking a
distinction between two “worlds.” The same, I believe, can be said for
other related distinctions he uses to characterize the properly human
engagement with the cosmos, such as that between sensibility and
understanding, or between the theoretical and the practical uses of
reason. These are not—and cannot be—a “two world” distinctions
because Kant takes the most fundamental “deliverance” of our human
engagement with the “world” to be inescapably unitary—as we
ourselves are, even though we also find ourselves engaging that world
in ways that present themselves to our reflective considerations as
deeply different. There is no bridge that we need to build between two
“worlds” because there is a single “world.” That we need to deal with
it, however, in different ways—i.e., in Kant’s terms, theoretically and
practically in the use of our reason—indicates something that bears
principally upon our make up as human, rather than upon the world
that we humans engage. Whatever duality there may be, it is one that
we encounter within the unity of our humanness as embodied finite
reason.
This brief essay is not the appropriate place to spell out the
various considerations from Kant’s texts and from his historical context
that indicate why this long interpretive tradition is mistaken. I am
more concerned with trying to figure out how and why construing Kant
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as a “two-world” theorist serves the purposes of the story that Milbank
and Blond tell. A quite tempting immediate answer might be that
construing Kant this ways allows him to be cast in quite unambiguous
terms as a “bad guy”—a bright bad guy, and even, if one is especially
charitable, an unwitting bad guy, but a bad guy nonetheless. That,
however, seems to me to be far too easy an answer, in part because it
is likely to lead us to argue (interminably) about whether or not Kant
really is a bad guy. That argument, however, is one that I believe
would distract us from engaging in a constructive manner the more
fundamental theological concerns of “Radical Orthodoxy,” since those
concerns do not seem to turn crucially upon either the historical or the
philosophical accuracy of this movement’s reading of Kant.
I think a more helpful way to go about understanding the role in
which Milbank and Blond have cast Kant is to return to what they want
to affirm over against a “two-worlds” Kant. Let me return to a couple
of passages cited earlier in this essay:
What is refused here is not the groundless extrapolation from the phenomenal,
but rather (without grounds) any notion of attributive analogy or participation,
that is to say any real kinship between the visible and invisible worlds (as has
been well argued by Phillip Blond). (Milbank 2000, 39, emphasis mine)
What the radical pietists realised was that to be human means, primarily, that
we must reckon with the immense depth behind things. There are only two
possible attitudes towards this depth: for the first, like Kant, we distinguish
what is clear from what is hidden; but then the depth is an abyss, and what
appears, as only apparent, will equally induce vertigo. This is why criticism,
the attitude of pure reason itself, is also the stance of nihilism. . . . The second
possibility is that we trust the depth, and appearance as the gift of depth, and
history as the restoration of the loss of this depth in Christ. (Milbank 1999, 32,
emphasis mine)

These passages contain three important phrases that, in view of their
evident rhetorical function as counters to a putatively “Kantian”
philosophical syntax of “the sublime,” stand in need of further
“parsing” that would identify their function principally in terms of the
theological/philosophical syntax that Radical Orthodoxy is endeavoring
to articulate. Such parsing, I suspect, could provide an appropriate
place from which a conversation—one less polemical than so far seems
to be the case—might begin between Radical Orthodoxy and the forms
of Catholic theology of which Radical Orthodoxy has been so sharply
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critical. Since it is not clear to me to what extent the main proponents
of Radical Orthodoxy are ready to shift the conversation to a less
polemical mode, it is at some peril that I, or anyone not a proponent,
single out what appear “from outside” as crucial markers of its positive
program. I thus do not propose to do any extensive parsing of these
phrases here. I shall, instead, only indicate why I think these are
phrases whose parsing might clear a small patch of common ground
on which to parley rather than polemicize—and hope that some might
come to parley.
The first is the imperative that “we must reckon with the
immense depth behind things.” This imperative seems very closely
aligned to what John Paul II has characterized as the “sapiential
dimension [of philosophy] as a search for the ultimate and overarching
meaning of life” (John Paul II 1998, §81)—a search that he sees as
basic to the dynamics of human life. I think that a fruitful parsing of
Milbank’s “depth” metaphor—which I also take to be more than “mere”
metaphor—might begin by locating it with reference to the dynamics
of the quest for meaning articulated by John Paul II. Such a linkage
would allow a far more differentiated analysis of the “secular” and of
the thinkers and the practices that have been charged with bringing
about and sustaining the secular. Like the proponents of Radical
Orthodoxy, John Paul II’s diagnosis of modernity traces its trajectory
towards nihilism, but also frames it in a larger trajectory of grace that,
more generously than the one traced in Radical Orthodoxy’s narrative,
enables the dynamics of that quest to function even within nihilism’s
most vehement denials of meaning. A similar generosity of grace can
be found in Charles Taylor’s reading of modernity in Sources of the
Self, a work in which exhibits to readers prepared to look for it a deep
seated Catholic theological sensibility that is more sure-handed and
less self-consciously proclaimed than that often found in the writings
of Radical Orthodoxy.
The second is “the refusal of any notion of attributive analogy or
participation, that is to say any real kinship between the visible and
the invisible worlds.” My suspicion here is that this concatenation of
phrases captures a key epistemic and metaphysical worry that drives
radical orthodoxy in that they are all evocative of a fundamental
“connection” to God—or, more precisely, a fundamental manner of
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intelligibly articulating such a connection—that is lost, severed, or
denied by and in the secular. This severance constitutes one defining
feature of “the stance of nihilism” into which all “secular” thinking is
consigned. In theological terms, the focus of this worry is upon the
possibility of rendering robustly intelligible the full scope of the
doctrine of Creation to and for a techno-empirical culture that has
made a conceptually and symbolically impoverished understanding of
causality the most potent instrument of its dominance. A similar worry
seems operative in the work of George Steiner, and in response to
such a worry, David Burrell, Kathryn Tanner, and Robert Sokolowski
have all offered evocative proposals for construing this doctrine in
“non-contrastive” terms that properly limn “its unique philosophiclinguistic situation” (Burrell 1993, 8) that then allow us to “finesse the
‘zero-sum’ presumptions [that modern culture has] of any divinehuman encounter” (Burrell 1993, 2). Exploration along the axes of
these proposals may clear an area with the potential to serve as
common ground.
The third phrase is “that we trust the depth, and appearance as
the gift of depth, and history as the restoration of the loss of this
depth in Christ”—which I take to capture an important Christological
and soteriological thrust within the positive theological/philosophical
program of Radical Orthodoxy. Parsing here might usefully attend once
again to the metaphor of “depth,” but, in this case, a more
fundamental focus would be upon the form and function of the “trust”
that stands over against, first, the “refusal” that is portrayed as the
characteristic attitude of the secular’s encounter with “appearance”
and the “visible world” and, second, the “vertigo” that is taken as the
characteristic outcome of that encounter. Charles Taylor’s work,
particularly the final three chapters of Sources of the Self, may prove
instructive here, even though it may not be directly helpful for clearing
common ground inasmuch as its analysis is indexed to a different
reading of Kant. Taylor reads modernity’s engagement with the
“depth” of appearances from an optic in which the “beautiful,” the
other lens of Kant’s “Analytic of the Power of Aesthetic Judgment,”
figures far more prominently than does the “sublime.” His reading
discerns in this engagement a set of attitudes and outcomes that is far
more richly variegated than seems to be displayed in the narrative of
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modernity as it is told in the sample of the literature of Radical
Orthodoxy that has been the focus of this essay.6
Notes
For a counter to the standard reading of Kant as Pelagian, see Mariña
1997.
1

Clayton Crockett (2001) also argues for the importance of the
sublime as a marker of modernity, but claims that Milbank “recoils
from the theological implications of this insight” which, on Crockett’s
reading of Kant, affirms imagination as a radically decentering function
of human subjectivity.
2

A notable recent political reading of the third Critique is Arendt 1982.
See also Beiner 1993.
3

The mention of Phillip Blond is referenced to his “Introduction:
Theology Before Philosophy” in Post Secular Philosophy (Blond 1998).
4

Previously Blond had noted that “for Kant sensibility seems never to
have any role other than to deliver over an acquiescence of the
empirical domain to the human mind” (Blond 1998, 13; cf. footnote 25
on p. 60).
5

I wish to thank Matthew Powell for a careful reading of the
penultimate version of this essay.
6
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